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Many people lack access to justice for urgent legal needs, although the value of 
protection of their rights is high. Can justice be affordable for people with less than 2$ a 
day to spend?  
 
Access to justice studies usually investigate the barriers to justice and suggest ways to 
remove them. This paper follows an alternative approach. Justice is seen as a set of 
goods that must be produced and delivered by people to other people. For access to 
justice to become available, five key dispute resolution tasks should be facilitated by 
services performed at costs that are affordable to users. The paper collects best 
practices that can be derived from the disciplines that study disputes. It sketches how 
they may be combined in a low cost dispute system ran by a “Microjustice Facilitator’. 
The conclusion is that these five essential services are not inherently costly to produce 
for people with limited resources, although there are still many gaps in our knowledge 
about providing them efficiently, which calls for coordinated innovation processes. It is 
also likely that the transaction costs associated to delivering justice are part of the 
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I. Introduction 
A. Access to Justice 
Access to justice is a problem in almost every jurisdiction. According to a recent report by 
the UN Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor, around four billion people are 
excluded from the formal legal system. In many developing countries, 25% of the 
population is not even registered as an individual, so access to education, health care, 
pensions, or participation in the market economy is problematic. As much as 70% of 
residential property in cities and in the countryside is not formalized, so it is less well 
protected against claims of outsiders, cannot be sold easily, or be used as collateral for a 
loan (Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor 2008). As to dispute resolution 
through courts and lawyers, the global picture is that the costs of access to these 
services are too high for all but a small proportion of rich individuals and businesses, 
unless governments or other donors step in to subsidize legal services and courts heavily 
(Rhode 2004; Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor 2008). Distance, legal 
costs, language problems, delay, and bureaucratic procedures, are among the most 
common barriers to justice (Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor 2008).  
 
As a result, many people, particularly the poor, see their personal security being 
threatened. Insecure property rights mean that they live in fear of eviction and 
expropriation. When a head of family dies, this throws into question who has the right to 
live in the family home and who can farm the land. ‘Malign dependency is a high risk’ for 
women, tenants, employees, and partners in small businesses, because they tend to 
invest more in relationships than their counterparts, and thus have more to loose from 
leaving the relationship (Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor 2008).   
 
The value of access to justice for citizens is thus generally recognized. According to one 
leading researcher on the relationship between governance and economic development, 
an improvement in the rule of law from relatively poor to merely average performance 
would result in an estimated fourfold increase in per capita incomes, a reduction in infant 
mortality of a similar magnitude, and significant gains in literacy (Kaufmann 2003; 
Kaufmann, Kraay et al. 2008). As to the elements of the rule of law that cause these 
effects, the role of democracy remains contested, whereas much evidence has been 
 
found that suggests a substantial contribution of the protection of property rights to 
economic growth (Buscaglia and Stephan 2005; Haggard, MacIntyre et al. 2008). The 
UN Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor, which consisted of former heads of 
state, cabinet ministers, leading jurists and economists from the North, South, West, and 
East summarized the state of the art by stating that if the law works for everyone it 
defines and enforces the rights and obligations of all, which allows people to interact in 
an atmosphere that is certain and predictable (…) It creates an environment in which the 
full spectrum of human creativity can flourish and prosperity can be built (Commission on 
Legal Empowerment of the Poor 2008).  
B. Access to Dispute Systems 
In this paper, we will concentrate on the needs for protection in disputes. Socio-legal 
research has rendered a rather precise picture of the most important types of conflicts 
that individuals experience (see Barendrecht, Kamminga et al. 2008 for a literature 
review). According to legal needs surveys, personal security in relation to outsiders and 
government (human rights protection) presents the most urgent category of problems. 
After this comes the core business of any dispute system: property conflicts and issues 
related to land and housing, problems between employer and employee, family 
problems, neighbor issues, and business conflicts. These disputes are typically relational 
in nature. They take place within the relationships in which people invest most, which 
also creates dependence. Here, dispute systems are more or less inevitable, because 
long term relationships have to cope with change in unexpected directions (Barendrecht 
2008).    
 
Then there are the less urgent (but more frequent) consumer problems, debt collection 
issues, and problems related to access to essential government services. Here the focus 
is more on enforcement of rights and obligations that are defined beforehand 
(Barendrecht 2008).  
 
In a dispute there is at least one person who wants a change in the status quo, a person 
who wants access to justice. This plaintiff wants to achieve something in relation to at 
least one other person, the defendant. The dispute system is the setting he has access 
to for seeking a solution to the dispute. Dispute systems may consist of formal elements 
such as courts or other neutrals, legal procedures, and legal services. Informal systems 
may include alternative dispute resolution (ADR) services such as mediation, but also 
supervision by people in a more or less hierarchical position (bosses, parents, teachers, 
clerics, village elders) and procedures before a tribunal appointed within a community.   
C. The Costs of Producing Justice and Transaction Costs 
If the value of a good is high, but it is not supplied in sufficient quantities to meet 
demand, that is surprising. The only explanation for this that economic theory allows is 
that the costs associated to delivery of the good—the sum of the production costs and 
the transactions costs of delivery—must be too high. If these costs would be lower, legal 
service providers would see a business in delivering access to justice, and the market 
would solve the problem.  
 
So, what do we know about the production costs and transaction costs of a legal 
system? The production costs can be the costs of creating rules, the costs of delivering 
legal services, or the costs of decision making by a court. Transaction costs include the 
costs of travelling to courts, the costs of contracting between legal service providers and 
their clients. They also encompass the costs of regulation of the legal profession, costs of 
monitoring courts, or other costs that are necessary to cope with what is often called 
market failure. An example of market failure is that clients have less information than 
lawyers (information asymmetry) so they may be exploited by them, which is one of the 




This paper is about the costs of producing justice in disputes. It focuses on the five most 
essential elements of a dispute system from the perspective of its users, and then 
explores whether these elements are inherently costly to deliver. Is justice indeed a 
luxury? Or are there best practices that make it possible to deliver justice to people living 
on less than 2$ a day? A companion paper (Barendrecht 2009) builds on this analysis, 
and investigates the transaction costs associated with making the legal system work, and 
in particular which market failures and government failures complicate delivery.  
D. Bottom-Up Approaches to Access to Justice and Microjustice 
This paper thus deviates from the usual approaches to the problem of access to justice in 
which the barriers to access are identified and remedies subsequently discussed. The 
literature tends to distinguish five waves of access to justice reforms, and focuses on 
supplying legal aid, public interest litigation, alternative dispute resolution, opening up the 
market for legal services, and better regulation of the legal profession (Cappeletti and 
Garth 1978; Parker 1999). The problem with this line of thought is that it is oriented 
towards the supply side; it either takes the legal system for granted or proposes changes 
in that system without a thorough analysis of the users’ needs. High costs of lawyers, for 
instance, or problems with understanding legislation are seen as barriers to access, and 
remedies are then sought in the direction of subsidized legal aid, pro bono legal services, 
or educating people about their rights. It may be, however, that legal services or courts 
are not the lowest cost solutions to the problem, and that laws do not address the most 
urgent problems of our legal system’s users.  
 
A demand side approach becomes increasingly fashionable in the area of law and 
development. Although spending by donors is still mostly on the formal system of courts, 
lawyers, and police (Jensen 2002; Carothers 2006; Wojkowska 2006), the possibilities of 
improving justice from the bottom up are attracting increasing attention. Bottom up 
strategies depart from the realities, and often try to improve informal ways of getting to 
just outcomes of disputes (Buscaglia and Stephan 2005). Examples of these approaches 
are the legal empowerment approach (Golub 2003), the para-legal programs ran by 
donors such as Open Society and World Bank, numerous community justice projects ran 
by local NGO’s, and the many attempts to incorporate informal justice systems in the 
formal system (Barron, Diprose et al. 2007; Byrne, Mirescu et al. 2007; Hammergren 
2007; Van Rooij 2007; Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor 2008; Lundy and 
McGovern 2008).   
 
Several reasons contribute to this shift towards bottom up approaches, and warrant a 
thorough analysis. First, top down legal reforms have proven less successful than hoped 
for. Investments in courts, prosecutors, bar associations, and western style codification 
do not trickle down where the poor majority can attain access to justice (Carothers 2006). 
Moreover, a formal (top-down) legal system seems to be a costly governance structure. 
In a situation of scarce resources, clients, governments, donors, and other interested 
parties should concentrate their efforts on the most effective policies. Finally, there is an 
increasing feeling that formal legal systems do not always adequately address the 
problems of individual citizens (Buscaglia and Stephan 2005). Commentators noted that 
they are formal indeed, sometimes outright bureaucratic, unnecessarily complex, and 
adversarial, and therefore putt extra stress on already tense relationships ((Hadfield 
2000). Their productivity in numbers of sustainable solutions per dollar and hour invested 
tends to be low. Thus, informal justice and alternative dispute resolution (ADR) have 
become central elements in policies for increasing the performance of legal systems all 
over the world (Wojkowska 2006). However, it is still questionable whether these policies 
are indeed the answer. Worries about informal justice and ADR include a low number of 
cases processed, a tendency to become more formal and legalistic over time, and 
inadequate protection of less powerful parties (Welsh 2001; Bingham 2008). There is 
mounting evidence that ADR cannot function properly without the context of a formal 
legal system (Hernandez-Crespo 2008).    
 
 
This uncertainty regarding what an efficient legal system should look like is becoming an 
impediment to effective rule of law policies in itself, as well as an obstacle to academic 
analysis of access to justice policies. If the vision of the system’s goals is unclear, it 
becomes hard to measure progress, select promising projects, and establish the reasons  
why access to justice is not delivered. Efforts to improve access to justice need focus—
focus on the most urgent legal needs, the most effective interventions, and the most 
relevant know how. 
 
Thus, this paper is organized around the essential tasks of a legal system, seen from the 
perspective of a person with limited resources who seeks access to justice. Departing 
from his legal needs, we look for the most effective interventions. Interventions can only 
help, though, if they are both affordable for the clients and sustainable to deliver for the 
suppliers, whether these are private legal services providers or government officials.  
 
Usually, the delivery of justice is more affordable and sustainable if it takes place at the 
local level, for example, by people in the same village or in the same part of the city. As 
we will see, most legal needs arise in local relationships, and local delivery of justice is 
usually less costly. The challenge therefore becomes how to organize delivery of justice 
through self-help and local labor, supported by the necessary elements of a formal legal 
system and modern technologies. This is what we have called the challenge to find 
microjustice (Barendrecht and Van Nispen 2008), because it is a similar challenge as the 
one to develop microcredit, micro-insurance, or micro-health-services.          
E. What follows 
Section II explains a model of five essential dispute resolution tasks, based on a review  
of the interdisciplinary literature regarding dispute systems (Barendrecht 2008). This 
model links knowledge about dispute systems from disciplines such as negotiation 
theory, conflict studies, microeconomics, institutional economics, and (comparative) legal 
research. This knowledge is now increasingly integrated in a new research area called 
dispute system design.  
 
Section III investigates best practices for facilitating these five dispute resolution tasks. 
These best practices are derived from the same literatures. The aim is to explore whether 
the corresponding services can be delivered in a low cost manner. Although the overview 
of best practices is preliminary, it strongly suggests each of the five tasks can be 
facilitated in a way that is affordable for the user of the dispute system and sustainable 
for the providers. Some services can be delivered on a person to person basis by local 
labor, other services can be produced ‘wholesale’ by looking for economies of scale.  
However, the investigation also shows that in some particular types of conflicts add-ons 
will be necessary, and are likely to be more costly.  
 
In Section IV, an outline is given of the way the best practices may be linked together. I 
draw the picture of a “Microjustice Facilitator” who runs a sustainable business that 
supports the five essential dispute resolution tasks for people with limited resources. 
Section V concludes and explores the implications. Under which conditions affordable 
and sustainable (microjustice) dispute services may emerge, remains to be seen. 
Delivering justice is not only a matter of low cost production, but also of dealing with the 
transaction costs of delivery. These will be discussed in a companion paper (Barendrecht 
2009). 
II. Best Practices for Facilitating Core Tasks of a Dispute System 
There is an emerging field of dispute system design (Ury, Brett et al. 1988; Costantino 
and Sickles Merchant 1996; Shariff 2003; Bingham 2008; Bordone 2008). This literature 
has identified some useful steps for a design process (diagnosis, design, implementation, 
evaluation) and singled out possible evaluation criteria for dispute systems (Bordone 
2008; Gramatikov, Barendrecht et al. 2008; Hadfield 2008). It also delivered building 
blocks of dispute systems that are likely to perform well. Recommendations include that 
 
they should be interest-based, with loop-backs to negotiation (Ury, Brett et al. 1988), 
inclusive (as to people and issues involved), allow for centralized information processing, 
delegate sub-processes efficiently, and vest control in the people most affected by 
decisions (Shariff 2003).  
 
From this literature, and from the practice of dispute systems, a basic model of a dispute 
system can be derived. This model (see figure 1 and table 1) contains the necessary and 
sufficient elements of a dispute system (Barendrecht 2008). For each of these elements, 
there are basic technologies for delivery.  
 
Task Description Basic technology 
1. Meet Centralized forum for information 
processing 
Make costs and benefits of participation for defendant 
higher than costs and benefits of fighting, 
appropriation, or avoiding 
2. Talk Communication and negotiation Support integrative negotiation  (interest based) 
3. Share Distributing value fairly Supply information about fair shares (sharing rules, 
objective criteria) 
4. Decide Decision making procedure Make option of a neutral decision available (at low 
cost) 
5. Stabilize Transparency and compliance Supply tools to make arrangements explicit;  
Make costs and benefits of compliance higher than 
those of non-compliance 
Table 1 Necessary and Sufficient Elements of a Dispute System with Basic Technologies for Delivery 
 
These five tasks, carried out by the disputants with help of dispute resolution services, 
form the necessary and sufficient elements of a dispute system. The five elements 
interact and reinforce each other. For instance, there are strong complementarities 
between judging (element 4, the option of invoking a neutral decision) on the one hand, 
and distributive negotiation on the other (element 3).  
 
The threat of a neutral decision positively influences the bargaining process, but these  
incentives are diluted in case of high costs of neutral decision making. Neutral decision 
making can build on communication between the parties and fill in the gaps in their 
negotiated agreement. Another complementarity is that the expectation of a fair process 
and a fair outcome increase the attractiveness of starting a dispute resolution process 
STABLE, TRANSPARENT OWNERSHIP 
AND RELATIONSHIPS: contracts, norms, 
registrations contribute to security, trust, 
investment in assets, human/social capital 
CHANGES in environment, 
know how, preferences, power, 
innovation: lead to conflicts 














Explicit expectations  + 
Incentives compliance 
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(element 1, meeting). Decisions that result from a fair process and reflect outcome 
fairness are also more likely to be complied to (element 5, Stabilize). 
 
Some other elements of a dispute system are useful add-ons for particular types of 
disputes. Extensive fact-finding may be necessary in cases of fraud, or accidents. Legal 
representation is indispensable for the accused of severe crimes. Appeals, and formal 
written elements of procedures may be necessary safeguards. But they are not 
indispensable elements of every dispute system, and many dispute systems exist that 
function without them.    
 
The assistance a system offers to the disputants for each of these five elementary tasks 
can be seen as goods (services). The tasks (meet, talk, share, decide, and stabilize) can 
be facilitated making use of the basic technologies. For each of these tasks, this can be 
done in many different ways. Among these practices, some are less costly than others. 
Exploring the best practices can give us a sense of the possibilities of producing these 
goods and services at a cost that is affordable for the users.  
A. Meet: Reasons to Attempt Cooperative Resolution 
Coping with conflict cooperatively requires interaction between the parties. Some form of 
centralized information processing is necessary (Shariff 2003). The parties require a 
meeting place or communication channel where both are present and willing to 
communicate about the conflict.  
 
For both of them, the net benefits and costs of meeting must be higher than the net 
benefits and costs of non-cooperative strategies, such as fighting, or avoiding. This is the 
basic technology for providing this first element of a dispute system (Barendrecht 2008). 
 
How can this meeting place be delivered in a low cost manner? Most differences of 
opinion and issues that require discussion are resolved because the parties meet and 
talk by themselves. A meeting place can usually be organized inexpensively if plaintiff 
and defendant are already in a long term relationship. Issues within a family, employment 
disputes, neighborhood disputes, and property issues about land or housing can usually 
be dealt with close to where the disputants live or work.  
 
On line structures for resolving disputes can be helpful if the parties live far apart. 
Additionally, this may solve the problem that both parties are not available at the same 
time. But they raise the costs for the clients, because written communication consumes 
more time, and may lead to misunderstanding.  
 
Making a low cost meeting place available, is not sufficient. Whether the defendant will 
go to a meeting place depends on his internal motivation and his external motivation 
(incentives). Factors that will influence this are attitudes (pro-social or egotistic),  
emotional state (anger, shame, guilt), social norms, reputational concerns, the costs of 
meeting, and the possibility of a default judgment against him. For instance, social norms 
play an important role in directing disputants to a neutral mediator in China, Japan, 
Korea, and Turkey, whereas this is much less so in the United States (Wall, Stark et al. 
2001). If such social norms are not existing, third parties may have to use pre-mediation 
skills to convince the parties to participate in the process, which adds to the costs. 
Reputational concerns can also be important reasons for meeting, for instance in  
consumer disputes with sellers of goods and services as defendants. 
 
Fighting – that is use of power – to deal with conflict, may be attractive for those who 
expect big gains from this strategy. Thus, a dispute system must reduce the net pay-off 
from fighting. One way to achieve this is through an enforceable prohibition of the use of 
violence. Another approach is to increase the expected gains from cooperation, which 
will happen in a stable environment, where normal participation in the economy is less 
 
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risky and more rewarding for all but a few (Hirshleifer 2000; Hirshleifer 2001; Garfinkel 
and Skaperdas 2007).   
 
Avoiding is an attractive strategy for those who expect big losses from cooperation. If 
defendants expect to undergo severe punishment in a dispute system, the system must 
contain sufficient incentives to compensate for this. It might even need some kind of 
forced cooperation, where the defendant is physically brought to court. This will be costly 
to organize; severe domestic violence and war crimes may fall in this category. In 
personal injury matters, or in case of big claims between large companies, the defendant 
may expect to pay large sums of money. A similar situation can occur in land disputes, 
where the defendant may assume that cooperation means that he must cede control 
over the land, wholly or partially. For such situations, a dispute system must provide 
strong incentives to participate in the process, which may again be costly.  
 
 One option commonly used in legal procedures is the one of a default judgment. If the 
defendant does not appear in court, the court will follow the plaintiff in his claim and 
render judgment against the defendant—if the claim is reasonably supported by available 
facts and evidence and is legally sufficient, see for instance Article 15 Principles of 
Transnational Civil Procedure (ALI and UNIDROIT 2004). Whether this provides 
sufficient incentives to appear in court is also a matter of the likelihood that the decision 
can be enforced against the plaintiff. 
 
A less costly option is that punishments are forfeited in exchange for a contribution to 
finding out the truth and rendering a healing process. Dispute systems delivering 
transitional justice often have this form. Participation in the process is stimulated by 
granting the defendants immunity from certain sanctions, as long as they cooperate 
(Schneider 2008). Similar arrangements for crimes can often be found in customary law 
in developing countries. 
B. Talk: Supporting Integrative Negotiation 
Negotiation is most often the way to solve conflicts. The basic technology of integrative 
negotiations is essential for this dispute resolution task. It consists of the following 
process (Walton and McKersie 1965; Fisher, Ury et al. 1991; Lewicki, Saunders et al. 
2006):  
(1) review and adjust relational conditions to create an environment that 
promotes communication and information-sharing; 
(2) review and adjust perceptions;  
(3) focus on interests: the needs, wishes and fears of the disputants;  
(4) take a joint problem-solving approach to the dispute;  
(5) be creative in developing a number of solutions;  
(6) and choose a (win-win) solution that best fits the interests of both parties.  
 
There is much research regarding the circumstances that enable integrative negotiations, 
and this is made accessible for practitioners (Moffitt, Bordone et al. 2005; Deutsch, 
Coleman et al. 2006; Oetzel and Ting-Toomey 2006). For instance, it helps if parties  can 
communicate openly about their interests, and explore many possible win-win solutions. 
When disputants feel they are treated with procedural justice they are more likely to 
reach integrative solutions (Hollander-Blumoff and Tyler 2008). Emotions and the 
interaction between the parties may or may not be productive in this respect, and must 
be somehow managed (Allred 2005). Coping skills can be important as well, because 
many disputes involve a loss. Victims of crime and of personal injury are obvious 
examples of plaintiffs who must cope with a new reality, but a divorce, the loss of a job, 
or a badly performed service can be difficult to live with as well.      
  
On the basis of this research, dispute resolution professionals have developed best 
practices to implement integrative negotiation. They have found methods for dealing with 
the different phases of the communication and negotiation process, as well as the most 
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common disruptions (Moore 2003). During the last decades ‘technical progress’ in this 
area has been fast. Once the parties sit down and are prepared to talk, modern conflict 
management techniques can improve the situation as experienced by the parties in most 
conflicts. Cognitive biases and irrational behavior can be combated by a variety of 
questioning (Fairfield and Allred 2007) and communication methods, such as reframing 
(Gray 2005). These methods help the parties define more precisely what they need, 
want, or fear, and to maximize utility within the scope of what is feasible and possible for 
these particular parties.  
 
Mediation, which uses these methods, is typically successful in about 60 to 70% of the 
cases in which this intervention is tried (Wall, Stark et al. 2001). Both contextual 
mediation strategies, where a mediator manages the process, and substantive strategies 
that deal directly with the issues, have been found effective (Martinez-Pecino, Munduate 
et al. 2008). Improving the relationship is another successful technique (Wall, Stark et al. 
2001). Working towards mutual recognition of interests and persons is often 
recommended, as well as empowering the parties to take dispute in their own hands 
again (Bush and Folger 2005). Recognition may be followed by an apology. Less 
effective are reflective strategies, where the mediator focuses on building rapport and 
trust, and approaches where the mediator focuses on the facts, or pushes for settlement 
(Wall, Stark et al. 2001).  
 
Facilitating negotiations through using these techniques can be done by mediators, but 
also by the parties themselves (Fisher, Ury et al. 1991; Ury 1991), by cooperative 
lawyers (Lande 2005; Lande 2008), or by online dispute resolution facilities (Katsh, Katsh 
et al. 2001; Braun, Brzostowski et al. 2006; Brett, Olekalns et al. 2007).     
 
The processes that help find workable solutions to conflicts do not need to be costly. 
Communication and negotiation skills are widely available and useful for other purposes 
than resolving conflicts. The parties themselves may have them or others in their 
surroundings. Basic training in negotiation and peer-mediation can be given in a few 
days. Even sophisticated mediation skills are available for a reasonable price, taking into 
account that mediation for an average conflict may take not more than two or three 
sessions of several hours.     
C. Share: Information about Fair Distribution 
The parties to a conflict usually also have distributive issues to solve. Dividing the pie is 
difficult, in particular in relationship conflicts, where household tasks, salaries and rents 
have to be adjusted to changing circumstances, and where assets have to be divided in 
case of divorce, or termination of a long term contract. Settling distributive issues is 
difficult in any negotiation, but is especially problematic in disputes, because both parties 
do not have the alternative of going to another buyer or seller for a similar transaction. 
 
Disputants are likely to resort to tactics that can bring them the biggest slice of the pie, 
but that also put the negotiation process at risk. They try to be patient, make extreme 
offers, commit themselves to making no further offers, try to hide information from the 
other party, and make efforts to develop alternative ways to serve their interests (Muthoo 
1999; Muthoo 2000; Carraro, Marchiori et al. 2006; Korobkin and Doherty 2007).  
 
One technology that may help the parties to solve distributive issues is to give them  
neutral information about a reasonable compromise. A dispute system can assist the 
parties with objective criteria (Fisher, Ury et al. 1991). Market prices, rules of thumb used 
in practice, social norms, of case law give people information about the way others dealt 
with similar problems.  
 
Objective criteria have a similar function in a dispute as information about a market price 
in a standard economic transaction (Barendrecht and Verdonschot 2008). Information 
about ‘going rates of justice’ gives both parties the idea what a fair outcome is, in which 
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they do not give away too much, and diminishes their fear of regretting the settlement. 
Descriptive information, that is telling them how others have actually distributed value, is 
more likely to help than prescriptive information, which tells them how some authority 
thinks they should settle (Barendrecht and Verdonschot 2008; Verdonschot 2009).   
 
On the basis of the theoretical literature and best practices found in actual dispute 
systems, Barendrecht and Verdonschot have identified nine properties of objective 
criteria that make them more useful as tools to settle distributive issues. Preferably, they:  
(1) are independent of willpower and allow for being applied objectively;  
(2) are perceived as legitimate; 
(3) lead to outcomes that are continuous in character, not binary; 
(4) weigh similar elements of the situation on both sides; 
(5) belong to parties, reflecting their ideas about legitimacy and appropriate 
neutral evaluation criteria;  
(6) do not claim exclusivity over other objective criteria;  
(7) allow decision makers to tailor the outcome to the specific situation; 
(8) are practical, in particular requiring low-cost fact-finding; and 
(9) provide social information about actual application by others. 
 
As to the contents of objective criteria, research on fairness and distributive justice has 
delivered many useful insights that can be turned into best practices (Konow 2003). 
Seven theoretical approaches to outcome justice can be distinguished: distributive 
justice, restorative justice, corrective justice, retributive justice, transformative justice, 
legal pragmatism, and formal justice (Verdonschot, Barendrecht et al. 2008). Justice 
research has made quite some progress to establish which type of criteria disputants find 
appropriate in different settings. Intra-family disputes are often settled on the basis of 
criteria that refer to need, whereas participants in commercial transactions tend to prefer 
equity (contribution to gains or losses) as the criterion for distribution (Konow 2003).   
 
Getting this information to disputants, and preferably also to the other people who have 
an interest in the dispute, is another problem the dispute system must solve. In a formal 
legal system, normative information is provided by precedents, codes, legislation, law 
treatises, and databases. Objective criteria that give clear indications of expected 
outcomes do not frequently occur in these legal sources, though. Lawyers and judges 
have knowledge about local ways to settle issues, just like the providers of informal 
dispute systems. For disputants, however, this information may be difficult to obtain. 
Legal advice can be acquired, but a lawyer will not always give his client a quantitative 
indication of the expected outcome in money, probability of success, or size of the 
sanction. Outcomes of concrete disputes can be difficult to predict, because of the many 
circumstances that influence a court decision. For strategic reasons, the parties will not 
disclose the legal advice they obtained to their opponent. A neutral opinion about the 
value of the case may be hard to obtain as well, for more or less the same reasons, 
although this may help the parties to settle (Dickinson and Hunnicutt 2005). 
 
Thus, information about reasonable sharing of the gains and burdens may be difficult to 
provide to the clients. The costs of this information are likely to be fairly high for individual 
disputants. The good news, however, is that these costs can be shared among many 
users of the legal system. One objective criterion can help thousands of disputants to 
settle their differences. In this way, dispute systems can reach economies of scale, at 
least for the most common disputes. 
 
Whether the costs of providing ‘the going rates of justice’ can be lowered in such a way 
that this information becomes affordable to the billions of people that presently live 
outside the scope of the formal legal system remains to be seen, however. Sharing rules, 
as we might call them, may differ from location to location. Different types of disputes 
such as divorce, inheritance, and termination of employment need different types of 
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sharing rules, and each typical dispute may have several issues for which sharing rules 
are needed.  
 
Still, economies of scale are possible. People living in the same village or the same part 
of a city, are likely to use similar sharing rules for inheritance, divorce, employment 
termination, or government appropriation. Across locations and cultures the issues are 
similar, and the number of possible sharing rules is limited. There are maybe five to ten 
ways to share property after the father dies, not hundreds. In the information age, 
collecting this information is a problem that can be solved.        
D. Decide: Option of a Neutral Decision 
A decision making procedure is another essential element of a dispute system. A low 
cost option of addressing a court, arbiter, or other neutral decision maker who can 
impose a solution, is the basic technology for this.  
 
The threat of a neutral intervention has different effects. It may be a necessary incentive 
to meet and start talking, and to let defendants make moves towards settlement, in 
particular if they are better off in the status quo than they expect to be after a fair solution 
of the dispute. The neutral also supervises the negotiations, because both parties know 
he can be called in to evaluate their conduct. And the neutral can decide on the outcome, 
if negotiations continue to fail (bargaining failure).  
 
Costs of accessing the neutral are of the essence. Costs include direct monetary costs, 
time spent, costs of delay, and costs of stress and the like (Gramatikov 2008). High costs 
of litigation diminish the fairness of settlements, bring back the tactics that lead to 
bargaining failure (delaying, extreme offers, commitment, etc.) and decrease the effects 
of supervision by the neutral. For the suitable price of access to a neutral an often cited 
criterion is that the sum of decision costs and error costs should be minimized (Tullock 
1980; Shavell 2004; Cabrillo and Fitzpatrick 2008)..       
 
The importance of low cost access to a neutral decision maker being established, we can 
turn to best practices for keeping the costs in check. The literature on legal procedure 
has stressed this may be achieved through judicial case management techniques and 
better information processing (Woolf 1996). Simplifying procedures, particularly having 
one procedure per relationship instead of several procedures for separate issues, is also 
a recurring recommendation (Cabrillo and Fitzpatrick 2008; Commission on Legal 
Empowerment of the Poor 2008).  
 
In legal procedures and in arbitration, a usual set-up is a written exchange of documents 
(pleadings) which explain the issues, sometimes a preparatory hearing in which issues 
are sorted out, and then some form of main hearing where both parties present their 
case and the available evidence (Chase and Hershkoff 2007). After this, the neutral 
decides the vast majority of cases, unless there is need for a more thorough 
investigation.  
 
Oral presentations by the parties can be a lower cost alternative because assistance of 
lawyers can make the written form more expensive. Supplying formats for defining 
interests, distributive issues, relevant facts for distribution, and possible solutions may be 
helpful as well. They can be made available through the internet, with a helpdesk or more 
sophisticated legal aid as a back-up.    
 
Another option to cut costs is a preliminary judgment, based on a tentative judicial 
assessment of the merits of a case or any part of a case (Miller 2008), which enables the 
parties to settle, to accept the judgment, or to require a more extensive investigation of 
the merits. Similar effects can be obtained by letting informal neutral decision makers be 
a first instance, and allowing appeal to a formal judge. This is often how informal justice 
systems and formal justice systems are integrated in developing countries. Another 
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variant is so-called evaluative mediation, where the mediator acts as a kind of decision 
maker in first instance, and the court decision can be seen as an appeal. The basic idea 
is that a sophisticated design and interplay between the levels of decision-making and 
appeal can be used to minimize error costs and decision costs  (Barendrecht, Bolt et al. 
2006). 
 
Expecting from the parties that they behave cooperatively in finding a solution, or in 
helping the court to find a solution, is likely to influence their motivation (Steinel and De 
Dreu 2004). This can be done through instructions, through using language that suggests 
cooperation (“partners” instead of “opponents”), or through rewards (De Dreu, Weingart 
et al. 2000). Motivating people to work on the problem, by making them responsible and 
accountable, and by stimulating self-reflection as well as perspective taking, also 
contributes. Procedural justice research stresses that disputants value voice and 
participation in the process, trustworthiness, neutrality, and interpersonal respect (Tyler 
1988; Tyler 1997). 
 
Courts all over the world are also trying to settle cases in (or close to) the court room, 
suggesting that the negotiation and the neutral decision making process should be 
integrated, and loop backs should be provided (Ury, Brett et al. 1988). Combinations of 
arbitration and mediation like Med-Arb, or Arb-Med, are proposed (Ross and Conlon 
2000). Research strongly suggests that mild time pressure on the disputants is essential 
for reaching outcomes, but conciliation in the court room is criticized for putting too much 
stress on the parties and being less effective (Harinck and De Dreu 2004; Trinder and 
Kellett 2007). Practices used in mediation, but also in German civil procedure, where the 
parties gradually move towards an outcome in a series of meetings may be a solution, 
but obviously add somewhat to the costs (Chase and Hershkoff 2007). Sensible 
limitations on the investments of the parties in fact-finding are also an essential way to 
save costs.  
 
Best practices for optimizing the interaction between the settlement activities of the 
parties and third party interventions are in the making. Lower court judges in family 
courts and employment courts seem to be able to handle yearly caseloads of several 
thousand disputes, because information processing is standardized, up to 80 or 90% is 
settled under their supervision, the remainder is dealt with in hearings of an hour or less, 
and the decisions are standardized to a large extent. Average variable costs of the third 
party intervention are then limited to one or a few hours of work for a professional, with a 
mark up for overhead.       
E. Stabilize: Tools to Create Transparency and Compliance 
Outcomes, either obtained by agreement or by a neutral decision, will become part of the 
future relationship of the disputants. Two basic technologies support this: (1) making the 
arrangements explicit, so that the parties know what to expect from each other, and 
taking care that the net benefits for the defendant (and the plaintiff) of complying with the 
outcome are higher than the net benefits of non-compliance.  
 
A low cost practice to make the outcome transparent is public explanation in the 
presence of interested third parties. Written individual settlement agreements, contracts, 
or judgments from a neutral decision maker can do the transparency job in a better way, 
but they may be costly to write. Best practices for low cost written transparency include 
standard formats for negotiating issues in an integrative manner, for defining issues and 
point of views, and for making explicit settlements and decisions. These formats may be 
linked to each other. One dispute document to be amended by the parties, their advisers, 
and if necessary by the neutral, may provide a structure for the whole dispute resolution 
process from initial diagnosis to final decision.  
 
Like other best practices discussed in this paper, these methods make use of economies 
of scale. This effect is enhanced if the focus is on the most important and frequent 
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disputes people experience. Divorce, termination of employment agreements, inheritance 
disputes, or personal injury have recurring issues, recurring criteria, and recurring 
solutions, so that these processes can be standardized to some extent..    
 
Best practices for ensuring compliance all depend on the general technology of making 
the net benefits of compliance bigger than the net benefits of non-compliance. Generally, 
enforcement is more likely if the disputants participated in the process of finding the 
solution and if they consider the procedure more fair (Hollander-Blumoff and Tyler 2008). 
 
The formal legal system usually provides for sanctions, such as forced sale of assets, 
bankruptcy proceedings, fines, as well as prison sentences. These sanctions are costly 
to apply. In an ideal situation, the threat of these sanctions is sufficient to induce 
compliance, so that they rarely have to be applied. In a situation of relative lawlessness, 
however, the compliance rate may be so low that many costly sanctions should be 
imposed to make threats of enforcement credible.   
 
Formal sanctions are by no means the only way to induce compliance. The psychological 
literature on compliance suggests many other mechanisms: reciprocation, the human 
tendency to be consistent in their acts, imitation of what others do, positive 
reinforcement, identification, and authority (Cialdini and Goldstein 2004). Reciprocity is a 
compliance mechanism that is likely to work in ongoing relationships and in close 
communities, and economists have built a substantial literature regarding self-enforcing 
contracts (Fehr and Schmidt 2002). These informal incentives and methods of motivating 
people to comply with their obligations may be far less costly.  
 
For property rights, businesses, and arrangements between members of a family some 
form of public acknowledgement of the situation can be effective as well. Registrations 
perform this function, but are expensive to set up and run because they have strong 
networking effects (Deininger 2003; Fitzpatrick 2005). Only if most transactions are 
registered do they give a reliable picture of the rights in question. The costs of 
registering, therefore, will often not outweigh the benefits for the users of the system.        
III. Linking Best Practices 
The best practices for delivering low cost dispute resolution services that we found are 
summarized in Table 2. The next question is whether and how they can be linked 
together in a dispute system. As we have seen, there are strong complementarities 
between the five tasks, and the services facilitating these tasks. In the practice of dispute 
resolution services this translates into business models that combine the tasks and let 
them be performed by one service provider. Mediators primarily facilitate integrative 
negotiation (task 2), but may also let the parties think about objective criteria (task 3), 
and in evaluative mediation they will even advise them to settle in a certain way (task 4). 
A judge decides (task 4), but also stimulates the parties to settle through negotiations 
(tasks 2 and 3) and contributes to enforcement by using his authority (task 5).  
 
To see how the five services can be performed more effectively, it is interesting to 
investigate whether all of them might be integrated in one business model, using the low 
cost best practices for all the tasks. In the following I will sketch the services of a 
Microjustice Facilitator, in order to illustrate how dispute systems may be able to build on 
the available best practices to become more affordable for people with limited resources 
and sustainable to deliver. Imagining how such a facilitator might organize his business, 
is a good way to investigate the critical joints and fixtures in a dispute system, and to 
establish where innovation is most needed.  
 
The name and the context are just examples, however. The same integration of tasks 
and best practices could take place to develop new models for mediation services, for 
arbitration, for services of judges, or for lawyers exploring new forms of cooperation  
(Lande 2005). 
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Tasks Basic technology Low cost best practices Situations with  need for 
additional services 
1. Meet Make costs and 
benefits of 
participation for 
defendant higher than 




- Local meeting places 
- Pre-mediation skills 
- Social norms to solve conflicts 
cooperatively  
- Enhance incentives that link to reputation 
of defendants to solve conflicts 
cooperatively  
- Option of default judgment 
Big distance between 
disputants:  
- On line meeting places  
Severe crimes, or 
defendants expect having to 
make big concessions:  
- Forced cooperation 




2. Talk Support integrative 
negotiation  (interest 
based) 
- Communication, active listening, 
questioning techniques 
- Reframing and adjusting perceptions 
- Managing emotions and interaction 
- Improving relationship, recognition, 
apology, supply of coping skills 
- Standard format integrative negotiations 
(identify interests, issues, explore win-
win solutions) 
Intractable conflict 
3. Share Supply information 
about fair shares 
(sharing rules, 
objective criteria) 
- Supply objective norms and criteria for 
three/five most common issues in most 
common disputes that: 
- can be applied easily; 
- weigh similar elements for both; 
- give a continuous range of outcomes, not 
binary answers (yes/no); 
- belong to the parties (legitimacy, fairness, 
appropriateness); 
- allow for adjustment to situation: 
- are not exclusive;  
- show what others did in similar situations;   
- Make this information widely available 
through internet or other means  
Exceptional (non-standard) 
disputes or disputes for 
which criteria are not yet 
available 
- Processes that lead to 
precedents 
- Other processes to 
develop criteria 
4. Decide Make option of a 
neutral decision 
available (at low cost) 
- Simple procedure (oral presentation, 
hearing, decision)  
- Judicial/neutral case-management and 
information processing 
- Online formats for defining interests, 
distributive issues, possible solutions, 
decisions 
- Stimulate cooperative attitude 
- Procedural justice: voice, participation, 
trustworthiness, neutrality, 
interpersonal respect. 
- Discussion of possible objective criteria 
for outcome 
- Integration of decision making and 
settlement  
- Mild time pressure 
- Preliminary judgments in more difficult 
cases 
- More generally: minimize sum of decision 
costs and error costs 
Fraud, contested crimes, 
severe crimes, and other 
situations where facts 
essential for distributing 
gains, losses, and sanctions 
remain disputed: 
- Extensive fact-finding.  
5. Stabilize Supply tools to make 
arrangements explicit;  
Make costs and 
benefits of 
compliance higher 
than those of non-
compliance 
- Standard online negotiating, settlement, 
and decision documents for most 
common disputes and issues; 
- Informal compliance mechanisms 
(reputation, reciprocity, identification, 
authority) 
- Registrations (may be costly) 
Situations where informal 
compliance mechanisms 
are insufficient:   
-  Formal sanctions, 
forced sale of assets; 
 Table 2 Some Low Cost Best Practices for Facilitating Five Dispute System Tasks  
A. The Microjustice Facilitator 
Inspired by the other microservices such as microcredit, micro-insurance and micro-
healthcare, it may be possible to develop new dispute resolution services in developing 
countries, where many people are not reached by the official justice system. Justice 
might be delivered locally, by people from the community to their peers, but supported by 
first-world technology (Barendrecht and Van Nispen 2008). Like communities always 
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have had money lenders, they also have informal dispute resolution providers: village 
elders, people’s courts, or informal mediators. And like has been the case with money 
lenders, their dispute services vary in quality and in price, making them not accessible for 
everyone. Microcredit reinvented the profession of the money lender, by taking apart the 
tasks of lending, funding, monitoring, and securing payment and finding low cost best 
practices for each of them. A similar innovation process is possible for services that aim 
to help people with solving their disputes.1   
 
The Microjustice Facilitator may be a person who already delivers dispute resolution 
services, and wants to make them more accessible to the poor. He could be a community 
leader, a priest or imam, or a lower court judge who has a vast area with many potential 
disputants to take care of, lacking the funds to serve all of them well.  
 
Or she could be someone starting her own dispute resolution practice, offering legal aid 
and mediation in a novel way. And maybe the services could be part of other 
microservices, aiming specifically on the linkages between property rights problems and 
credit, or helping to deal with the family problems that are important for the clients of 
maternity care. In developed countries he could be an entrepreneurial mediator or a 
student from a legal aid clinic, someone working at a company selling insurance for legal 
expenses, or a commission dealing with consumer complaints. 
 
The Microjustice Facilitator would make use of the best practices for delivering low cost 
access set out in a preliminary way in Table 2. Using his local knowledge, he would 
certainly first investigate which unmet legal needs are most prevalent in his community.   
He would focus on a limited number of the most urgent problems. Maybe he would 
choose from the major crisis in relationships: divorce like situations and associated 
domestic violence, inheritance issues and the ensuing property rights conflicts, 
termination and major changes in long term employment and business relationships, 
termination/major change of long term land use arrangements, and maybe conflict 
between neighbors. Or he would specialize in solving problems in one time transactions: 
complaints by customers against suppliers of goods and services, and by citizens against 
governments agents from which they need cooperation.  
B. Integrated Dispute Services 
In order to perform her services, the facilitator would be supported by state of the art 
technology and infrastructure. This could mean she has a toolbox (see Table 3 for an 
example of its possible contents) with questions and formats for uncovering the 
perceptions of both parties of the problem, associated communication problems, 
interests, distributive issues, possible solutions, ways of making outcomes transparent, 
and ways to induce compliance. With this toolbox, she can help the parties process 
information centrally, during the five different stages of the dispute resolution process 
(meeting, communication and negotiation, sharing, deciding, stabilizing).   
 
Moreover, the facilitator and his clients have access to the sharing rules that are applied 
to the three to five most common issues in each of the standard disputes in which he 
specializes. These objective criteria are collected by him, and possibly by colleagues or 
other parties interested in supplying objective information about fair and just outcomes. 
 
The start of the process would be an intake, in which the client explores the problem, if 
necessary with help of the facilitator. The intake is guided by the toolbox. A simple 
version of this intake and diagnosis process can even be supplied online, if this is 
practicable and the lower cost solution. This initial map of the problem and the tasks that 
have to be performed will be enriched and improved in the course of the process.  
 
                                                   
1 The Microjustice Initiative (www.microjustice.org) is committed to facilitate this process.           
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With this map of the problem, and some advice on how to communicate and negotiate, 
the client may try to contact the other party again. For this service, the client pays a small 
fee.  
 
A next level of service would entail the Microjustice Facilitator trying to solve the “meeting 
problem” if the client does not succeed in reaching a decision by himself. Using pre-
mediation skills, he would try to engage the other party and invite him to participate.  
 
 
Possible Microjustice Facilitator Toolbox 
 
 
Self help tools for client (with possible assistance) 
- Diagnosis 
- Suggestions how to communicate 
- And negotiate with other party 
 
 
Tools for contacting and engaging other party: 
- Explaining guarantees neutral perspective 
- Process if other party participates 
- Process if other party does not participate   
 
Questions and formats for uncovering and making 
transparent: 
- Problem as experienced by client 
- Problem as experienced by other party 
- Communication barriers 
- Interests of each of the parties 
- Possible solutions 
- Distributive issues 
- Outcomes  
- Ways to induce compliance 
One document processes information for all tasks   
 
 
Objective criteria (descriptive norms): 
- Used locally  
- And possibly in similar communities 
- For standard problems which are focus 
- For each problem 3/5 most important issues  
 
 
Tools to create a forum for decision making if no 
agreement: 
- Panel formed depending on stakes, level of 
trust, complexity, expectations enforceability 
- Decision on basis of information organized in 
document 
- Plus information from hearing 
 
 
Tools to stimulate compliance: 
- Gradually and gently increasing transparency of 
non-compliance 
- Building on best practices  
 
The facilitator would also make clear that the process will continue until a satisfactory 
solution has been found, also if the defendant does not participate. This may be a highly 
controversial element of the dispute system, but if such a ‘solution by default’ process 
would not be available, many attempts to solve disputes would fail in the initial meeting 
phase. Best practices from legal systems suggest that such a default-mechanism is 
necessary in many cases (see Section III.A).  
 
The precise design of default mechanism is one of the issues for further innovation of 
dispute systems. Judgments by defaults in legal dispute resolutions systems tend to be 
harsh: the plaintiff gets what he asks for, with a limited check by the court of the 
reasonableness of his claim. It may be possible to develop safeguards for the defendant 
that the case will be decided neutrally, considering his interests as well, even if he does 
not participate. On the one hand, this will help to build trust in the system and the neutral 
role of the facilitator. On the other hand the motivation for the defendant to participate 
must be triggered, and the mere risk that his views will be taken into account in an 
uncontrolled way may be insufficient as an incentive.  
 
If the parties are willing to meet, the facilitator leads them through the next tasks of 
talking and sharing. He tackles communication problems and facilitates integrative 
negotiations, probably using the basic techniques of a mediator. WIth respect to the 
distributive aspects, the parties are assisted by the facilitator to define the issues that 
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have to be decided. If the parties cannot agree on these, she asks them to consider the 
objective criteria that have been made available, and think about other possible criteria 
that could be applicable. 
 
The task of deciding can be performed by the parties, but the shadow of a low cost 
neutral decision is an essential element of the system. After attempting a gradual 
narrowing of the range of possible outcomes, the facilitator could steer the process to an 
agreement to disagree on the remaining issues. His system would then lead the parties 
to choosing a decision-maker. If there is no agreement on this, the facilitator chooses the 
forum. The value of the stakes, the complexity of applying objective criteria to the 
distributive issues, the expectations about problems with enforcement, and other factors 
will determine the forum. This forum can consist of the facilitator herself as the lowest 
cost option, but also of another neutral person, a panel of neutrals, an expert, a group of 
peers, or any combination of these persons.  
 
Because the problems, perceptions, interests, distributive issues, the possible objective 
criteria, and the range of acceptable outcomes are already defined, the procedure before 
the neutral(s) can be short and effective. A hearing where the panel can ask questions 
and the parties can clarify their points of view is likely to be sufficient. The facilitator can 
help the neutral(s) with getting information from the parties, and assist the parties to bring 
forward their points of view.  For this third party intervention a fixed fee should be paid by 
the plaintiff, or by both parties if the defendant participates.  
 
If, exceptionally, the panel finds that additional fact-finding is necessary and cost-efficient 
from the perspective of minimizing error and decision costs, it can decide this extra 
inquiry to take place. In order to keep the expected costs of neutral intervention low, an 
option is to require from the panel that it combines this interim decision on procedure  
with a preliminary decision on the distributive issues, based on the information that is 
available and the probabilities of different outcomes from the additional fact-finding. 
Another fixed fee for the additional fact-finding would be appropriate.   
 
Making outcomes transparent (task 5) is done by the facilitator with the help of the 
formats in his toolbox. Stabilizing also entails his task to find ways to stimulate 
compliance. Depending on the context, social norms, and possible reputation effects, the 
facilitator may use a mechanism of gradually exposing the degree of non-cooperation by 
the defendant. A first step may be to disclose to a limited audience that the defendant 
has an unsolved dispute, followed by disclosing non-participation, and/or non-compliance 
with or third-party intervention.    
 
Payment for the stabilization phase could be due in, say, six months after the decision 
has been made. This could be combined with an evaluation of the process by both 
parties, who could give their views on the quality of the process, the quality of the 
outcome, and the costs they spent. These evaluations can also be part of the monitoring 
system that is needed to ensure future clients that the facilitator is neutral and unbiased.   
C. Discussion 
The sketch of a Microjustice Facilitator gives an example of how the best practices for 
each of the five essential dispute resolution tasks can be combined and integrated in an 
innovative dispute system. There are hundreds, possibly thousands ways to combine 
and link the best practices. Thus, there are a great many other possible dispute systems 
that can be put together from these components. Moreover, this article only contains a 
preliminary list of these best practices. Innovating dispute systems is a matter of 
improving, redesigning, testing, and evaluation of many different models. The framework 
of five essential dispute resolution tasks and their basic technologies can provide a basis 
for evaluation of existing dispute system, and for systematic innovation efforts. Best 
practices regarding each of the elements can guide these efforts, and new best practices 




If this framework is applied to the model of the Microjustice Facilitator, we get a clear 
view of the problem areas of making this model work in practice. On many points there 
can be hesitation whether the system would work in the way intended. Will the neutral 
positioning of the facilitator attract sufficient clients, in particular in the face of competition 
of legal service providers who work for the plaintiff exclusively? Can the facilitator engage 
the defendant? How will the facilitator be accepted in the community, and especially by 
powerful defendants? Is it practicable to continue the dispute resolution process without 
the cooperation of the defendant? Can the facilitator define the distributive issues in such 
a way that the costs of neutral decision making remain limited? How will the neutral 
forum have to be organized? Will it be possible to find neutrals with the required qualities 
against reasonable costs? Is it possible to organize compliance in the way envisaged?  
 
Besides the complexity of dispute resolution services themselves, these issues also 
make clear that dispute resolution services take place in a broader context. There is 
something like a market for justice, where different providers of services are active, from 
village elders, to courts and professional lawyers. This market has to be studies as well, 
as part of the innovation process.   
IV. Conclusion 
The goal of this article is to explore the production costs of justice, and in particular the 
methods for delivering access to a low cost system from which people can expect a fair 
resolution of their most common disputes. The model of a basic dispute system, with five 
tasks and the technologies to perform them, proved to be a good structure for classifying 
best practices, and investigating systematically how they complement each other.  
 
None of the five core dispute resolution services seems prohibitively costly to produce if 
we look at the best practices available for each of these services. These elements of a 
dispute system can be provided by local labor and are indeed regularly provided within 
communities, including communities with limited resources. Delivering justice by people 
to their fellow citizens against affordable prices (microjustice), seems possible.  
 
There are some areas where low cost delivery may be more problematic in practice, 
though. The best practices for letting disputants meet are available, but not yet built into 
an integrated model ready to be applied. This is certainly apparent if we compare them 
with the extensive models for communication and negotiation that the ADR (mediation) 
and ODR (online dispute resolution) communities have developed. Sharing rules, the 
objective criteria for distributive issues, can only be produced low cost if economies of 
scale can be reached. The ways to do this have yet to be uncovered. Low cost third party 
intervention seems to be possible, but there is not yet a generally accepted model for this 
available, which systematically integrates the best that conflict research, legal processes, 
and ADR have on offer. Stabilization through registrations of property rights and identities 
is another area where economies of scale are important. Registrations have strong 
network effects so that the initial investment is likely to be high.  
 
What seems needed in these areas, is systematic innovation. Starting from the basis 
technologies, and from the existing best practices, an integrated effort is necessary to 
innovate dispute services. In co-development processes with users and dispute 
resolution providers, experiences must be collected and improvements defined. Testing 
and evaluation is necessary, of both the dispute resolution technology and the business 
models that form part of the system. The five element model of a dispute system used in 
this paper presents a framework for this.     
 
Some types of disputes are more difficult to solve at low cost. Inducing perpetrators of 
severe crimes to participate, extensive fact-finding, providing outcomes for non-standard 
cases, legal representation, and formal sanctions are likely much more costly. But this 
does not seem to affect the core business of dispute systems, which is providing neutral 
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governance for long term relationships that must adapt to change. From there, 
systematic dispute system design efforts can be extended to other justice needs like 
consumer problems, and complaints about government services. 
 
This paper focused on the production costs of facilitating the five core dispute resolution 
tasks, and found them not to be a fundamental problem, although there are still many 
ways in which existing best practices can be improved. If this is the conclusion, there 
may also be other reasons access to justice is lacking for so many people in so many 
situations. Economic theory points in the direction of high transaction costs, probably in 
light of market and government failure. These topics will be dealt with in another paper 
(Barendrecht 2009). Here, we already encountered some hints where high transaction 
costs and market failure might be located. Information regarding fair outcomes is often 
unavailable, which may have to do with incentives to produce and distribute such 
information, whereas economies of scale are important here. The costs of accessing a 
neutral (a court) can be quite high, although it seems possible to organize neutral 
intervention in a low cost manner. Strong complementarities exist, which is an often 
mentioned cause of market failure.  
 
Providing access to justice is an immense challenge, because five types of dispute 
resolution services have to be delivered, to two clients who are in conflict, which almost 
by definition means they find cooperation difficult. Market circumstances, and the 
difficulties of performing the five tasks in combination, add to the complexity. Still there is 
reason to believe that access to justice does not have to be a luxury good; its major 
components can be delivered in a way that is affordable for people with limited 
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